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Abstract—Spin-Transfer Torque RAM (STTRAM) is an 
emerging Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) technology that provides 
better endurance, write energy and performance than traditional 
NVM technologies such as Flash. In embedded application such as 
microcontroller SoC of Internet of Things (IoT), embedded Flash 
(eFlash) is widely employed. However, eFlash is also associated 
with cost. Therefore, replacing eFlash with STTRAM is desirable 
in IoTs for power-efficiency. Although promising, STTRAM 
brings several new security and privacy challenges that pose a 
significant threat to sensitive data in memory. This is inevitable 
due to the underlying dependency of this memory technology on 
environmental parameters such as temperature and magnetic 
fields that can be exploited by an adversary to tamper with the 
program and data. In this paper, we investigate these attacks and 
propose a novel memory architecture for attack resilient IoT 
network. The information redundancy present in a homogeneous 
peer-to-peer connected IoT network is exploited to restore the 
corrupted memory of any IoT node when under attack. We are 
able to build a failsafe IoT system with STTRAM based program 
memory which allows guaranteed execution of all the IoT nodes 
without complete shutdown of any node under attack. 
Experimental results using commercial IoT boards demonstrate 
the latency and energy overhead of the attack recovery process. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the fastest growing 
compute segment. It has been predicted that by the year 2020, 
there will be around 40 billion smart devices connected via the 
IoT platform [1]. These smart devices will change the way we 
interact with the environment, thereby spawning a whole array 
of new application domains like home automation, industrial 
devices, wearable technology, healthcare monitoring, logistics, 
to name a few. 
IoTs can be of various types and designed for very specific 
applications. Major semiconductor companies such as Intel, 
NXP, Qualcomm, RPi Foundation, etc. have come up with their 
own IoT solutions for smart devices. Various prototyping IoTs 
are currently available in the market such as Arduino [2], 
Qualcomm Dragonboard [3], Raspberry Pi [4], etc. The 
application of IoTs range from home automation such as smart 
bulbs and automated temperature controllers, wearable 
technology such as fitness bands and smart watches, healthcare 
such as medication dispensing systems, industries such as 
weather and climate monitoring, and, agriculture, machinery 
and so on. In order to cater to these vast array of application 
areas, these IoT devices need to be small, fast and energy 
efficient. Vast majority of IoTs are energy constrained and there 
is a growing need to reduce the power consumption of these 
devices [5]. Despite the constraints on size, memory, cost and 
power, these IoTs are desirable to have long operational lifetime 
for unattended continuous execution. The IoTs are often used in 
a distributed network environment [6] and due to the critical 
nature of the applications, data security and privacy is a growing 
concern for such a distributed system [7]. 
IoTs are primarily microcontroller based embedded devices 
with limited amount of memory. Typically, the application 
firmware for the IoT is stored in eFlash based memory. 
However, eFlash suffers from high latency (~us), low 
endurance (~100,000 Program/Erase cycles) and high write 
energy (pJ per bit). STTRAM on the other hand has much better 
latency (~ns), low power consumption (~fJ per bit) and high 
endurance (~1016 cycles), which makes it a promising viable 
candidate to replace the eFlash based memory on IoTs. 
However, it has been shown that STTRAM is susceptible to 
data security and data privacy attacks [8]-[11]. Data security 
pertains to data corruption by malicious attack with the 
intention to launch Denial-of-Service (DoS). These attacks 
exploit the fact that STTRAM is fundamentally susceptible to 
ambient parameters such as magnetic field and temperature. For 
STTRAM LLC, tampering during active mode of operation is 
critical than tampering in power down mode. This is true since 
the LLC is always invalidated at power ON. However, when 
STTRAM is employed to store the program (such as eFlash 
replacement), attacks during both active and power down mode 
becomes critical. Furthermore, the preventive solutions to 
maintain the integrity of STTRAM LLC cannot be extended to 
STTRAM program memory.   
Data privacy pertains to sensitive data such as keys and 
passwords being compromised. Storage such as Hard Disk 
Drive (HDD) has been the non-volatile part of memory system 
traditionally protected by encryption. Although effective, the 
latency associated with encryption makes it non-trivial for 
application in higher levels of memory stack especially LLC. 
For eFlash replacement in SoC environment the data security 
concerns are more serious than data privacy since the data 
privacy attack models for LLC does not hold true in the 
proposed application.   
In this paper, we investigate possible attack models on 
STTRAM program memory. We also propose a robust and 
secure fault-tolerant IoT network architecture which is capable 
of tolerating magnetic and thermal attacks on embedded 
STTRAM based program memory. We assume attack sensors 
such as STTRAM with low free layer volume and weak write 
[8] to detect the attack. The activities are disabled during the 
attack and the STTRAM contents are discarded after attack. 
Finally, the program memory is recovered through peer-to-peer 
connection from neighboring healthy units. A small portion of 
the Electrically Programmable Read Only Memory (EPROM) 
on the IoT is dedicated to store the recovery routine that is 
executed to restore the programs and applications. The 
proposed ideas are validated using commercial IoT boards 
interconnected with network interface card. To the best of our 
knowledge this the first effort towards replacing eFlash with 
STTRAM.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
provides a background of the existing IoT device architecture, 
STTRAM basics and the attack model. Section III describes the 
proposed architecture. Section IV shows experimental results 
of the proposed architecture. Section V contains some relevant 
discussions on the proposed work, and conclusions are drawn 
in Section VI. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview of a generic IoT device 
A generic IoT device has the following basic components as 
shown in Fig. 1. The Micro-Controller Unit (MCU) is the main 
logic and controlling system of the IoT. The input/output 
connections available to the IoT are serial UART (Universal 
Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter), GPIO (General Purpose 
Input and Output), and a NIC (Network Interface Card). The 
UART is used for serial asynchronous data transfer between 
devices. The GPIO pins are used to connect sensors, actuators, 
and other additional components to the IoT. The NIC, either 
Ethernet or WiFi is used to provide a network identity to the IoT 
and connect it to a central server or other IoTs in a network. 
There are two types of memory devices in the IoT, eFlash 
and SRAM. The eFlash memory is used to store the application 
firmware for the IoT. SRAM is used to store dynamic runtime 
data. The eFlash memory is split into two partitions, a small 
Bootloader section with lock bits and a larger section for the 
application program. The eFlash is programmed before the first 
run of the device using a dedicated flash memory programmer. 
The available memories on the device are interfaced to the MCU 
via a memory controller which is responsible for selective 
memory access from the available range of memory. There is 
another small low speed memory on the IoT namely the 
EPROM. It is a low speed electrically programmable hardware, 
which holds the bootrom that triggers the bootloader code 
present in the eFlash. Some portion of the eFlash is also made 
available to store persistent data across reboots. 
B. Overview of STTRAM 
Fig. 2 shows the STTRAM cell schematic with Magnetic 
Tunnel Junction (MTJ) as the storage element. The MTJ 
contains a free and a pinned magnetic layer. The resistance of 
the MTJ stack is high (low) if free layer magnetic orientation is 
anti-parallel (parallel) compared to the fixed layer. The MTJ can 
be toggled from parallel to anti-parallel (or vice versa) by 
injecting current from source-line to bitline (or vice versa). The 
data in MTJ is stored in the form of magnetization. The data 
stored is ‘1’ if the free layer magnetization is anti-parallel to 
fixed layer magnetization and ‘0’ if they are parallel.  
C. Benefits of replacing Flash with STTRAM 
Table I summarizes the comparison between NAND-flash and 
STTRAM [12]. The eFlash memory suffers in performance due 
to its high latency, ~20-200us based on read or write. 
STTRAM, on the other hand, has a much better read and write 
performance, close to few nanoseconds. Flash memory also has 
a lower lifetime as it tends to wear away faster. Furthermore, 
eFlash requires large write current and is costly. STTRAM is 
written with a small current and read by evaluating the sense 
margin and does not wear away like eFlash. STTRAM also has 
a very low footprint, and can achieve densities as high as 
DRAM. This makes STTRAM a viable replacement for the 
eFlash on the resource constrained embedded devices like IoTs.  
 
Fig. 1.  Simplified structure of a generic IoT with MCU, memory 
and peripherals. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Schematic of STTRAM bitcell showing MTJ. 
 
TABLE I. Comparison between NAND Flash and STTRAM 
Device Type NAND Flash STTRAM 
Present Density 64 Gb/chip 2 Mb/chip 
Cell size (SLC) 4F2 4F2 
MLC Capability 4 bits/Cell 4 bits/Cell 
Program Energy/bit 10 nJ 0.02 pJ 
Access Time (W/R) 200/20 us 10/10ns 
Endurance/Retention 105/10 yr 1016/10 yr 
Cost/GB 10x 1x 
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D. Attack model: magnetic attack on STTRAM 
The magnetization orientation of the pinned layer is fixed using 
an anti-ferromagnetic coupling and it cannot be changed using 
nominal current or external magnetic field. Contrary to this, the 
free layer could be toggled by passing current or by applying 
magnetic field. The magnetization dynamics of the MTJ free 
layer is governed by LLG equation [13]. 
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Where  m⃗⃗⃗  is unit vectors representing local magnetic moment, 
Is is spin current, G(ψ) is the transmission co-efficient, ℏ is 
reduced Planck’s constant, α is Gilbert damping parameter and 
ep⃗⃗⃗⃗  is the unit vector along fixed layer magnetization. The 
effective field is represented by Heff⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ = Ha⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  + Hk⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ + Hd⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ + Hex⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  , 
where Ha is applied field, Hk is anisotropy field, Hd is 
demagnetization field and Hex is exchange field.  
In STTRAM the writing of MTJ is done using STT term (for 
low power consumption) and external field Ha is kept 0. 
However, Ha can also be used to toggle the magnetization in 
absence of charge current (field term, eq. (1)). Note that 
magnetic field-based toggling is the foundation of Magnetic 
RAM. The attacker can exploit this extra knob to corrupt the 
free layer data [8] [9]. Both permanent magnet as well as 
electromagnet could be used for tampering by the adversary. 
It has been noted in [8] [9] that the attacks on STTRAM could 
be launched either through static (DC) magnetic field or 
alternating (AC) magnetic field.  The DC attack is less 
detrimental as it can only create unipolar failures. For example, 
a magnetic field will cause failures only for the bits whose free 
layer orientation is opposite to the applied field. However, the 
AC field could cause more damage as it will affect both storage 
polarities. Due to ease of AC field generation using a low-cost 
electromagnet this type of attack is highly likely. There are two 
attack scenarios:  
(a) Attack during active mode: The objective of the attack is to 
launch Denial-of-Service (DoS). A carefully orchestrated DoS 
attack can result in severe consequences during secure data 
processing and financial transactions to name a few.  
(b) Attack during passive mode: The magnetic attack can also 
be carried out when the system is OFF. In the proposed 
application in STTRAM program memory such attacks could 
boot the system in unwanted state.  
E. Sensor design 
The attack can occur while the IoT is powered ON and powered 
OFF. Therefore, both active and passive sensors should be 
deployed to sense the attack. 
(a) Active sensor: The purpose of the active sensor is to sense 
the attack few microseconds before the failure of functional bits 
so as to allow saving of current execution states to EPROM.  
The sensor sends a programmable interrupt to the MCU when 
it detects a magnetic attack. The active sensors can be designed 
using lower free layer volume and injection of disturb current 
[8] [9].  
(b) Passive sensor: The purpose of the passive sensor is to 
detect the attack when IoT is powered OFF to prevent the 
system from consuming tampered program/data when the IoT 
is powered ON. The passive sensor is essentially same as active 
sensor without the disturb current.  
 
 
Fig. 3.  Schematic Attack sensors in STTRAM array. 
 
  
Fig. 4.  Dual homogenous IOT network. 
 
  
Fig. 5.  Modified structure of IoT with STTRAM program 
memory and modified MCU state machine. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 shows the deployment of active/passive sensors every 
1024 row of the memory array. Adjacent sensors in a row stores 
‘1’ and ‘0’ alternatively. This ensures detecting both polarities 
of magnetic attack. However, the retention time of the sensor 
should be tailored to be more than the estimated OFF time of 
the IoTs so that the sensor error in passive mode should be 
correlated to the attack and not to the retention failures. When 
the IoT is powered ON, before initializing the application 
firmware, the sensor addresses are checked by the STTRAM 
Integrity Checker on the STTRAM Memory Module for signs 
of any previous attack. If any attack is detected, the IoT goes 
into the recovery mode to request other IoT on the network to 
provide the backup firmware. 
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we describe the proposed framework. The 
proposed approach followed by different stages of the IoTs 
during normal and attack scenarios are presented. 
A. Proposed approach 
For simplicity we consider a dual homogeneous IoT network 
as shown in Fig. 4. The network consists of two identical IoTs. 
The eFlash of both the IoTs have identical application programs 
to perform the same function. The two IoTs are connected to the 
same network over WiFi or Ethernet interfaced through their 
respective NIC. The two devices are also connected over a serial 
communication channel interfaced through their UART ports 
for special purposes. The required sensors for the IoTs are 
connected to their respective GPIO ports.  
In the proposed design (Fig. 5), the eFlash is completely 
replaced with STTRAM. However, this poses the possibility of 
magnetic or thermal attack as discussed above. Since the 
STTRAM now contains the application program, any attack on 
the STTRAM scrambles the program binary and results in a 
complete disruption and failure of the normal sequence of 
operations in the IoT. There is also no possibility to recover and 
resume normal operation. The solution is to include some 
failsafe routine to provide a backup and restore functionality of 
the program memory. The backup and restore functionality is 
introduced by adding two special program routines: Support 
Request and Support Assist in the EPROM. To include this, the 
EPROM is segmented into four parts, as shown in Fig. 6. The 
first segment is reserved for the bootrom which is a small write 
protected segment that is first run when the IoT is powered up. 
It is responsible for loading the bootloader from the STTRAM. 
The second and the third segments are reserved for the Support 
Assist and Support Request programs for the backup and restore 
routine. The overhead of Support Assist and Support Request 
code is very low (few bytes). The Support Request code has 
instructions to send a request message, receive backup firmware 
bytes, write the bytes to STTRAM and reboot. The Support 
Assist code has instructions to read firmware bytes from 
STTRAM, send the bytes to the requesting IoT and reboot. The 
total space overhead for the two routines is less than 10 bytes 
(assuming one byte for each instruction). The rest of the 
EPROM is available to the application firmware to store any 
persistent data. 
The STTRAM memory modules of the IoT devices in the 
network are equipped with active and passive attack sensors that 
are capable of sensing any magnetic or thermal attack when it is 
ramping up (Fig. 3). These sensor arrays are placed at regular 
intervals of 1024 rows so that they are evenly distributed over 
the STTRAM. Each sensor array is connected to a STTRAM 
Integrity Checker on the memory module. The STTRAM 
Integrity Checker checks the sensor arrays at a periodic interval 
of a few microseconds for any ramping attack. When any IoT 
senses an attack it stalls the system. After the attack subsides it 
executes the Support Request routine to request for memory 
recovery from the other IoT device on the network. When an IoT 
receives a memory recovery request from the other IoT on the 
network, it executes the Support Assist routine to send the 
                                        
Fig. 6.  Modified EPROM layout of IoT. 
 
 
1. Attack sensed by attack sensor · 2. HALT Interrupt · 3. Attack over 
sensed by attack sensor · 4. Prequest interrupt · 5. Execute Support Request 
in EPROM · 6. Recovery Request message · 7. Passist interrupt · 8. Execute 
Support Assist in EPROM · 9. Firmware recovery data · 10. Write 
firmware to STTRAM 
 
Fig. 7.  Attack handling. The sequence of events are numbered 
and explained. 
 
recovery data from its own program memory back to the IoT 
under attack. The detailed steps performed by the IoT in the 
attack scenario (Fig. 7) are described below.  
B. Boot up and normal operation 
When the IoT is powered up, the bootrom in the EPROM starts 
the hardware tests which runs the STTRAM Integrity Checker 
on the memory module to check for the authenticity of the 
STTRAM program memory. After passing the integrity test, the 
bootrom triggers the bootloader code in the STTRAM. The 
bootloader in the STTRAM initializes the application firmware 
from the Program Memory. It looks for any saved execution 
state in the EPROM and if present, loads the MCU with the 
saved state to resume execution form that state. The saved state 
in the EPROM is erased to prevent any inconsistent state 
configuration of the MCU for future reboots. If no saved state 
is present, the MCU starts with a clean state. During normal 
operation the IoT sensors (e.g, image sensor nodes) capture data 
and send the data to be processed to the IoT. The data is 
transferred to the IoT through the GPIO ports and the memory 
controller transfers it to the SRAM to be processed by the 
MCU. The IoT can process the data or store it to the STTRAM. 
It can also share the data to the other IoT in the network by 
transmitting through the network interface. 
C. Attack sensing 
During the normal operation of the IoT, if an adversary tries to 
attack the STTRAM with the intention to scramble the stored 
firmware, the attack sensors and the Integrity Checker is able to 
sense the attack ahead of time. The sensor array is 
preconfigured to hold an alternate sequence of ‘0’ and ‘1’. In 
case of an attack the sensor array on the STTRAM no longer 
retains their original sequence. The STTRAM Integrity 
Checker detects the scrambled sensor arrays and sends the 
HALT interrupt as an attack signal to the microcontroller. 
When the microcontroller receives the HALT interrupt, it halts 
the running application and saves the current execution state to 
the EPROM section available for program use. This ensures 
that no data is lost. Moreover, this allows the system to resume 
normal operation from the exact same state when the attack is 
over. When the attack subsides, the attack sensors senses the 
magnetic field strength going down, and removes the HALT 
interrupt from the microcontroller. The Integrity Checker then 
sends a programmable interrupt, Prequest to the microcontroller 
which reboots the IoT in Support Request mode and starts 
executing the recovery request code from the EPROM. 
If the adversary tries to launch the attack when the IoT is 
powered OFF, the passive sensors are able to detect the attack 
due to failure of sensor bits. When the IoT is powered up after 
the attack, the bootrom triggers the STTRAM Integrity Checker 
and the STTRAM will fail the integrity check due to the 
modified sensor array from the previous attack. The bootrom 
then sets the working mode of the IoT to the Support Request 
mode and starts executing the recovery request code from the 
EPROM. 
D. Support request 
In the Support Request mode, the IoT starts executing the 
recovery request code from the EPROM. The recovery request 
routine writes a request code message at the UART Tx port to 
send to the other IoT on the network. Since this is a critical 
operation, a wired connection is preferable to a wireless 
network interface. The request routine after sending the request 
code message waits to receive data from the UART Rx port. 
The Support Request code consists of the following 
instructions: 
1. Send recovery request message  
2. Receive backup firmware byte 
3. Write firmware byte to STTRAM address 
4. Increment STTRAM address index 
5. Reboot 
Assuming 1 byte for each of the instructions, the space 
overhead of Support Request routine is 5 bytes. 
E. Support assist 
The IoT microcontroller is programmed to listen to a 
programmable interrupt, Passist. When an IoT receives the 
request code message on its UART Rx port, the UART 
controller sends a programmable interrupt Passist to the 
microcontroller. On receiving the interrupt, the microcontroller 
saves the current execution state to the EPROM, and reboots 
the IoT in Support Assist mode and starts executing the 
recovery assist code in the EPROM. The recovery assist routine 
starts reading the application firmware in the program memory 
and bootloader code from the STTRAM and writes serially to 
the UART Tx port to send to the requesting IoT on the network. 
The Support Assist code consists of the following instructions: 
1. Read firmware byte from STTRAM address  
2. Send firmware byte to UART Tx 
3. Increment STTRAM address index 
4. Reboot 
 
Fig. 8.  State machine of the MCU of a generic IoT. 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Modified state machine of the proposed architecture. 
 Assuming 1 byte for each of the instructions, the space 
overhead of Support Assist routine is 4 bytes. 
F. Recovery 
When the assisting IoT starts sending the firmware over the 
UART connection, the recovery request routine writes the 
Program Memory and Bootloader partitions with the new 
firmware, overwriting any potential scrambled code from the 
attack. When the firmware transmission is complete, the sensor 
arrays are reset to its original configuration of alternating ‘0’ 
and ‘1’. The recovery assist routine on the assisting IoT after 
transmitting the entire firmware from the STTRAM, reboots the 
IoT in normal operation mode. 
On a normal IoT device, a hypothetical state machine of the 
MCU can have four states (Fig. 8). When the device is powered 
off, it is in State-0. When the device powers up the MCU is in 
State-1, where it bootloader from EPROM loads the bootloader 
from eFlash (State-2). When the bootloader initializes the 
application firmware from the eFlash, it goes to State-3, where 
it starts executing the program. For any data read or write 
operation on the shared bus (connected to the eFlash, SRAM, 
I/O etc.) it goes to State-4. When it resumes execution from 
eFlash, it goes back to State-3.  
In the proposed framework, the state machine is modified to 
include the other backup and restore functionality (Fig. 9). The 
States from 1 to 4 remain same as before. After power-on, the 
STTRAM Integrity Checker runs the test. If the test fails, it sets 
the operation mode of the device to Support Request mode 
(State-6) and starts executing the recovery request routine. 
After recovery completion, it reboots to State-1. When running 
in normal operation mode, if the execution state needs to be 
saved to EPROM to start the Support Request/Assist routine, it 
goes to State-5. It then reboots the device in Support Request 
Mode (State-6) or Support Assist mode (State-7). When 
executing the Support Request routine from EPROM, it 
receives the backup firmware and writes to STTRAM. After the 
recovery is complete, it reboots the device in normal operation 
mode (State-1). When executing the Support Assist routine 
from EPROM, it reads the firmware from STTRAM and 
transfers to the requesting IoT. After the transfer is over, it 
reboots the device in normal operation mode (State-1). 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The energy and latency overhead of the proposed recovery 
mechanism is estimated using a network of Qualcomm 
DragonBoard 410c and Raspberry Pi3 IoT boards (Fig. 10). The 
detailed specifications of the IoTs used are given in Table II [3] 
[4]. The IoT devices are tested with both wired and wireless 
network connections. The devices are powered with a regulated 
DC voltage source of 5V and the power drawn on each board 
in idle situation is observed to be 0.32A. The attack scenario is 
triggered with a user input to the software running on the IoT1, 
which triggers the transfer of 100 MB data from the supporting 
IoT (IoT2). The power consumption statistics is shown in Table 
3. From Table III we can conclude that energy consumed to 
restore the program memory of size 100MB using Ethernet 
(WiFi) connection is 8.44J (190J). The corresponding latency 
overhead is 9sec (1023sec). The energy and latency overhead 
could be minimized by reducing the amount of recovery data. 
This can be achieved by using STTRAM with higher energy 
barrier to make them robust against magnetic field, 
implementing stronger ECC to protect against low error rates, 
identifying the corrupted segments of the program memory 
using ECC and fetching only those blocks from healthy units. 
Future research will focus on developing a simulation 
framework to quantify the tradeoff of replacing eFlash with 
STTRAM with respect to attack resilience.    
 
Fig. 10.  Experimental setup. Two IoTs are connected using 
Ethernet/WiFi. IoT1 is under attack whereas IoT2 provides the 
support. 
TABLE II. Specifications of DragonBoard and Raspberry Pi  
IoT DragonBoard 410c Raspberry Pi 3 
SoC Qualcomm 
Snapdragon 410 
Broadcom 
BCM2837 
CPU Quad-core ARM® 
Cortex® A53 at up 
to 1.2 GHz per core 
4× ARM Cortex-
A53, 1.2GHz 
GPU Qualcomm Adreno 
306 
Broadcom 
VideoCore IV 
RAM 1GB LPDDR3 
(533MHz) 
1GB LPDDR2  
(900 MHz) 
Networking Wi-Fi 802.11 b/g/n 
2.4GHz 
10/100 Ethernet, 
2.4GHz 802.11n 
wireless 
Bluetooth Bluetooth 4.1 Bluetooth 4.1, BLE 
Storage 8GB eMMC 4.5 / 
microSD 3.0  
microSD 
GPIO 40-pin header 40-pin header 
 
TABLE III. Experimental results for 100MB data transfer 
Network Ethernet WiFi 
Latency 9 sec 1023 sec 
Average data rate 89 Mbps 782 Kbps 
Extra current drawn 0.37A 0.35A 
Energy/bit 8.44 nJ 190 nJ 
 
V. DISCUSSIONS 
A. Authenticity and privacy of received data 
An adversary can cause authenticity and privacy issues during 
the recovery process by tampering the communication between 
two IoTs. The issues are as follows: (a) The adversary can 
snoop the data during transfer thus getting access to sensitive 
information; (b) The adversary can also inject tampered data 
during the transfer; and, (c) The adversary can mimic the 
support request. The IoT that receives the request may not 
recognize that the request is from an adversary and not an IoT; 
thereby sending the sensitive program data to adversary. To 
avoid these scenarios, data can be encrypted using public-key 
encryption. The corresponding public-private keys should be 
stored in the EPROM of the IoTs which adds some storage 
overhead. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [14] [15] 
can also be employed to generate keys. 
B. Issues related to mode of communication 
The communication between two IoTs can be either wired or 
wireless. However, these two modes have some pros and cons. 
The wired connection is faster, more reliable and less prone to 
interference compared to wireless communication. However, 
over the long distance the signal strength drops and the wired 
connection can also be physically tampered by the adversary 
thus data security is breached.  On the other hand, Bluetooth 
has its own embedded data protection. However, Bluetooth has 
very short communication distance and again, adversary can 
hamper any wireless communication using a physical barrier. 
Therefore, depending upon the requirement mode of operation 
can be selected. 
C. Other modes of attack 
Although this paper focused on magnetic attack, STTRAM is 
also susceptible to thermal attack. The proposed approach is 
equally applicable to thermal attack scenarios. A temperature 
sensor based on STTRAM bitcell can be employed to detect the 
attack and trigger the recovery procedure proposed in this 
paper.  
D. Applicability to other non-volatile memory technologies 
The proposed methodology could also be extended to evaluate 
the feasibility of replacing eFlash with other emerging non-
volatile memory technologies such as Resistive RAM 
(ReRAM) and Phase Change Memory (PCM) [12].   
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper the implications and challenges of replacing 
eFlash with STTRAM in embedded devices like IoTs are 
discussed. A novel attack resilient architecture is proposed 
which allows the devices on the network to recover from attacks 
and continue execution without shutting down completely. The 
energy and latency overheads of the proposed architecture is 
presented through the experimental results. 
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